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ABSTRACT
State courts decide claims based on federal or sister-state law
every day. Although the applicable constitutional provisions
are different, there are significant similarities in the way the
Supreme Court conceptualizes the constraints on how those
claims must be treated. One project of this Article is to chart
those similarities, providing a unified account of the Court’s
approach to judicial federalism. The larger project, however,
is not to describe the Court’s approach, but to replace it. The
current emphasis on discrimination and interference imposes
burdensome and unwarranted obligations on state courts. A
more flexible approach to judicial federalism is needed, and
this Article takes important steps in that direction by
developing a new analytical framework focused on prejudice.
Prejudice may result when a state court renders a decision on
the merits that does not adequately respect the law being
applied. Or it may result when the same court refuses to
entertain a suit in circumstances where no alternative forum
is available. Neither result should be countenanced. But
when a state court declines to decide a claim, and does so in a
way that produces no prejudice to the legal rights involved,
the abstention should be tolerated—and perhaps even
applauded.
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INTRODUCTION
Students typically enter law school with the
understandable impression that Missouri courts decide
claims based on Missouri law. And in fact, that is primarily
what they do. But of course Missouri courts may also decide
claims based on the laws of a sister state or the laws of the
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United States.1 As with cases where federal courts decide
state law claims, these situations implicate judicial
federalism.
Unlike those cases, however, the issues
surrounding the obligations of state courts remain
understudied and undertheorized.2
There are significant similarities in the Supreme
Court's approach to the way state courts must treat claims
derived from the law of another actor within the federal
system. The first project of this Article is to develop an
account of the current doctrine. To be sure, the applicable
constitutional provisions are different. Federal claims, which
implicate vertical judicial federalism, are governed primarily
by the Supremacy Clause, while sister-state claims, which
implicate horizontal judicial federalism, are governed
primarily by the Full Faith and Credit clause. But in both
the vertical and horizontal contexts, the factors that appear
most relevant are discrimination and interference. A state
court has limited power to refuse to decide a case that falls
within its standard jurisdictional rules, and even those rules
may not be applied if they contribute to discrimination or
interference. In the horizontal context, doctrines like choice
of law and forum non conveniens will often provide a route to
mitigate the burdens that would otherwise be imposed, but
in the vertical context states are obligated to decide the
federal claim, and often to apply federal procedures, even if it
is burdensome to do so.
The second project of this Article is to argue that the
doctrine surrounding judicial federalism should be
States may also decide claims based on the laws of a foreign country.
The application of foreign law does not generally implicate constitutional
concerns and is outside the scope of this Article.
2 Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2
(2006) (discussing lack of attention paid to reverse-Erie doctrine). While
it may still be the case that the Erie doctrine is undertheorized, it is
certainly not for lack of effort. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Substance,
Procedure, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877 (2011); Craig Green,
Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595 (2008); Joseph P. Bauer, The
1

Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the
Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235 (1999); John Hart Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).
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reconceived. The focus in these cases should be on whether
a state court treats legal rights created by other actors
within the federal system prejudicially. At various points,
the Supreme Court has gestured toward the concept of
prejudice, but it has never made it a consistent and explicit
factor in its analysis. A focus on prejudice would still capture
meaningful interference, but would tolerate and therefore deemphasize certain forms of discrimination. It would ensure
that rights created by other actors in the system are
respected, but would provide states with increased flexibility
to structure and administer their judicial systems. In the
end, it would pave the way for state court authority to
decline to decide certain federal or sister-state claims, an
authority which this article characterizes as reverse
abstention.
I. DESCRIBING THE OLD MODEL
A. Vertical Cases
State courts are involved in vertical federalism when
they are asked to decide federal claims. In such cases, the
body of law being applied is sourced in an exercise of federal
power, and there are constitutional constraints that
structure state-court application of federal law.
The
fundamental constitutional principle in these cases is
supremacy. The Supremacy Clause in Article VI provides
not only that the laws of the United States “shall be the
supreme Law of the Land,” but also that “the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby.”3 Those provisions impose
obligations on state courts to treat federal law in a particular
way.
But the Supremacy Clause has never been read to
create an unlimited power by the federal government to
control state courts, even with respect to the resolution of

3

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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federal claims.4 Instead, the Supreme Court has articulated
the contours of the obligations imposed by the Supremacy
Clause in a series of cases dating back to Claflin v.
Houseman in 1876.5 The defining principles that emerge
from those cases is that state courts are constitutionally
prohibited from applying rules that discriminate against
federal claims, and cannot apply even facially neutral rules if
those rules interfere with the vindication of federal interests.
Parts of the antidiscrimination model of vertical
federalism are relatively straightforward.
Claflin
established the proposition that state courts should be
presumed competent to hear federal claims.6 That is, absent
some affirmative step taken by Congress to strip the state
courts of jurisdiction,7 state courts are assumed to have
See Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption:
The Proposed
Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 VILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1999);
Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer
State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism , 32 IND.
4

L. REV. 71, 108 (1998). Parmet and others more forcefully argue against
unlimited Congressional control of state-court procedures in the
adjudication of state-law claims. Parmet, supra, at 39–41, 55; Anthony J.
Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J.
947, 989 (2001). However, other commentators have found a nearly
unlimited power over state courts in the Supremacy Clause. Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2023
(1993); Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May
Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law? , 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1029–30 (1995).
5 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 130 (1876).
As discussed infra notes 6–7 and
accompanying text, Claflin deals primarily with the authority rather
than the obligation to hear federal claims. The line of cases dealing with
the obligation to decide federal claims starts instead with Mondou v. New
York, N. H. & R. H. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912).
6 Id. at 136.
7 Id.
The Court’s preemption doctrines inform how Congress may
divest state courts of their presumed concurrent jurisdiction. Such
jurisdiction stripping may occur by express Congressional directive or by
“unmistakable implication” found in the legislative history. Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 460–62 (1990). The third option is a finding of
“clear incompatibility” between state-court jurisdiction and federal
interests. Id. at 464. However, this method is fairly unhelpful since it can
be overcome by two generally applicable arguments. First, state-court
adjudication of federal claims always promotes the federal interest in
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authority to hear claims arising out of federal law. But if a
state court chooses to exercise that authority, it must do so in
a way that respects the supremacy of federal law.
Most fundamentally, a state court cannot choose to
disregard the federal law.8 Deciding a claim that is properly
governed by federal law according to the substantive law of
the state is the clearest violation of federal supremacy
imaginable. The determination of when a claim is properly
governed by federal law essentially boils down to a
preemption analysis.9 If that analysis suggests that the
federal law creates a particular cause of action, then that
federal law must provide the rules of decision by which that
cause of action is assessed. The use of some other body of
law is fundamentally inconsistent with the status of federal
law as the "supreme Law of the Land."10 Accordingly, a state
court is never permitted under the Supremacy Clause to
discriminate against the application of substantive federal
law by substituting some other law in its place.
A state court is, however, generally permitted to apply
its own procedural rules when deciding a federal claim.11
enforcement of its laws. Id. at 467. Second, federal interest in uniformity
of interpretation is preserved by the structural operations of state-court
adjudication of federal claims: state courts are bound by federal
decisions, but federal courts are not likewise bound by state-court
interpretations of federal law. Id. at 464–65.
8 See, e.g., Mondou v. New York, N. H. & R. H. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57
(1912); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1947).
9 Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 40
(2006); see also Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88
GEO. L.J. 2085, 2105 (2000) (discussing the weakness of the presumption
against preemption in light of Felder).
As Louise Weinberg has
suggested, the inquiry is not necessarily a detailed one. Once a state
court finds a federal interest, any countervailing state interests are
useless in the face of the Supremacy Clause’s mandate. Louise Weinberg,
The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1743, 1797 (1992).
10 Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws:
“Actual”
Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1779 (1992).
11 The classic statement of the state court’s right to apply its own
procedure comes from Professor Hart: “The general rule, bottomed
deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial
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This is the subject of the “Reverse Erie” analysis, which is
used to determine the circumstances under which a state is
obligated to follow federal procedures in the course of
enforcing federal substantive rights. The Supreme Court's
articulation of the contours of this analysis has not always
been a model of clarity,12 but the consistent focus has been on
the substantiality of the federal procedural rule at issue. A
federal procedural rule is binding on state courts deciding
federal claims if it is valid13 and substantial in the sense that
it is directly related to the vindication of the federal
substantive right.
The Supreme Court has developed these principles in
four cases decided since Erie v. Tompkins.14 In Brown, the
Court held that a strict state pleading rule could not be
interposed to dismiss a federal claim when the parallel
federal pleading rule would have permitted the claim to
survive.15 The Court viewed the local rule as problematic
because it “impose[d] unnecessary burdens upon rights of
recovery authorized by federal laws.”16 Similarly, Dice held
that state procedural rules regarding the allocation of
factfinding between judge and jury could not be applied to
displace the federal guarantee of trial by jury because that
guarantee was “too substantial a part of the rights accorded
by the Act.”17 More recently, the Court in Felder rejected the
procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.”
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954).
12 Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2
(2006).
13 Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on
Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 99–100 (2003). The validity of
procedural rules, at least when it comes to their operation in state courts,
is rooted in the Necessary and Proper Clause. Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth
Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures , 44
VILL. L. REV. 1, 18 (1999).
14 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15 Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1949).
16 Id. at 298.
17 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363
(1952).
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application of a state notice-of-claim rule, in part because
such a rule would produce different outcomes “based solely
on whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court”
and in part because it concluded that the state rule would
interfere with “the substantial rights of the parties under
controlling federal law.”18 But not all cases have found that
state procedural rules must give way to competing federal
rules. In Johnson, the Court found that a state court was
entitled to apply its own rules governing the right to appeal
in a Section 1983 case.19 To the extent that the state court
undermined a federal interest, the nature of the latter
interest was purely procedural.20 As such, the state rule did
not substantially affect the vindication of any substantive
federal right, and the state was entitled to apply it.21
The results in these cases can be cast in
antidiscrimination terms. A state court deciding a federal
claim is bound to apply all parts of the federal law that are
essential to the vindication of the federal substantive right.
Failure to do so—either by applying state substantive law or
state procedures that displace substantial federal
procedures—results in unacceptable discrimination because
the nature of the federal claim is affected by its location in a
state court. Johnson highlights another dimension of this
principle as well. Central to that result was the Court's
conclusion that the state procedure at issue was a “neutral
state Rule regarding the administration of the state
courts.”22 This step in the Court's analysis makes clear that
a state procedural rule would be problematic if it applied
exclusively to federal claims, even if the competing federal
procedural rule would not otherwise be deemed as
substantially related to the federal substantive right. Put
together, this suggests that state courts are not permitted to
discriminate against federal law (by treating it differently
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 151 (1988).
Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922–23 (1997).
20 Id. at 918.
21 Id. at 921-22.
22 Id. at 918.
18
19
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than it would be treated in federal court) or against federal
claims (by treating them differently than state claims).
The discussion thus far has centered around how a
state court must treat federal claims once it has decided to
hear them. A harder question concerns the circumstances
under which a state court is obligated to hear federal claims
in the first place. Stated conversely, this is the question of
when the federal government is entitled to commandeer state
courts for the resolution of federal claims. A discussion of
this issue must necessarily begin with Testa v. Katt.23
There, a Rhode Island state court refused to enforce a federal
statute that called for treble damages on the grounds that
the statute was penal in nature.24 In overturning that
refusal, the Supreme Court held that state courts have not
just the power, but also the obligation to hear and enforce
federal law claims when they share jurisdiction with the
federal courts.25 Justice Black argued that permitting state
courts to decline the enforcement of federal law “disregards
the purpose and effect of [the Supremacy Clause].”26
Therefore, the principles embedded in the Supremacy Clause
granted to Congress a constitutional power to require state
courts to decide federal claims.
The scope and status of the federal power recognized
in Testa was brought into question by the Supreme Court's
330 U.S. 386 (1947).
Id. at 388. Under a stalwart doctrine of choice of law, courts
frequently refuse to enforce foreign penal laws. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court viewed the case as a straightforward application of that
doctrine; Black’s response was that the doctrine could not be applied
because it is impermissible for a state court to treat federal law as
foreign. Id. at 389 (“[W]e cannot accept the basic premise on which the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that it has no more obligation to
enforce a valid penal law of the United States than it ahs to enforce a
penal law of another state or a foreign country. Such a broad assumption
flies in the fact of the fact that the States of the Union constitute a
nation.”).
25 Id. at 390–91. In his dissent in Haywood, Justice Thomas went
further, arguing that a state’s power to adjudicate federal claims did not
thereby create a duty to do so. Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2121
(2009).
26 Id. at 389.
23
24
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subsequent decisions regarding the power of Congress to
require state legislatures and executives to enforce federal
law. New York imposed significant limits on the federal
power to commandeer state legislative officials;27 Printz
recognized similar limits on the power to commandeer state
executive officials.28 In both cases, however, the Court went
out of its way to distinguish judicial commandeering,29 and to
reaffirm the comparatively broad power with respect to state
judicial officials. Thus, even after Printz and New York,
Congress retains the power to impose on the state courts an
obligation to hear and decide claims based on federal law.
Though concededly broad, the power to commandeer
under Testa is not unlimited.
Rather, the Court has
consistently acknowledged that state courts might decline to
hear federal claims if they have a valid excuse for doing so.
The question, then, becomes: what constitutes a valid
excuse? The response to this question has led first and
foremost to the development of a strong antidiscrimination
principle.30 So it is clear that rejecting a claim on the
grounds that the applicable law is federal in nature is not
defensible on valid excuse grounds.31
This is hardly
surprising; to find otherwise would be to undermine the
commandeering power substantially. On the other hand, the
Court has often found occasion to repeat Henry Hart's
New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
29 Id. at 907; New York, 505 U.S. at 179–80. Justice Scalia in the
Printz opinion proffered several grounds for the distinction between
state-court commandeering and commandeering state executives. First,
he claimed that the Framers envisioned state courts as necessary coarbiters of federal law. Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal
27
28

Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of
Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 77 (1998). Second, Scalia noted

that the Framers implied in Madisonian Compromise (and ultimately the
Constitution’s text) the possibility that no lower federal courts would be
created. Id. at 78–79. This would necessitate state courts as initial fora
for federal claims. Id. at 79. Finally, Scalia found that the State Judges
Clause created a “distinctive” view of state judiciary and compelled their
compliance with federal law (and commandeering). Id.
30 See, e.g., Haywood, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2116.
31 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990).
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observation “that federal law takes the state courts as it
finds them.”32 Invocation of a “neutral rule of judicial
administration” has therefore been upheld, even when the
rule has been applied to refuse jurisdiction over a federal
claim.33 In Herb, for example, a state court dismissed a
FELA case on the grounds that the claim arose outside the
court's territorial jurisdiction.34 The same rule would have
led to the dismissal of a parallel state claim,35 and that
neutrality rendered the rule a “valid excuse” to the obligation
to hear the federal claim that would otherwise be imposed.
Facial neutrality of that sort does not always
immunize a state court refusal to hear federal claims,
however. In the most recent decision in this area, the
Supreme Court in Haywood v. Drown rejected New York's
decision to decline jurisdiction over a Section 1983 claim,
even though the rule used to reach that result would also
have led the court to decline jurisdiction over a parallel claim
under state law.36 While recognizing that past decisions
See supra note 11; see also Mondou v. New York, 223 U.S. 1, 56
(1912) (approving that Congress did not, in granting concurrent
jurisdiction, attempt to control “[state] modes of procedure”); Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (“[T]he requirement that a state court of
competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not
necessarily include within it a requirement that the State create a court
competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is presented.”);
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916)
(finding that the Seventh Amendment jury right does not apply to state
adjudications of federal claims); Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases,
State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise , 1995 WIS. L. REV.
40, 178 (1995) (noting that “there is no ordinary requirement that state
courts mimic federal courts procedurally when they hear federal
matters”).
33 See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & R.H. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387
(1912), Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 123 (1945), Missouri ex rel.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1950).
34 Herb, 324 U.S. at 118–19.
35 Id. at 123.
36 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2112–13 (2009). New York’s
Correction Law § 24, the statute at issue, divested New York’s generaljurisdiction trial courts “of jurisdiction over § 1983 suits that seek money
damages from correction officers.” Id. at 2112.
32
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turned primarily on an assessment of the rule's equal
application to both federal and state claims, Justice Stevens
concluded that the absence of discrimination was not enough
to bring a case within the valid excuse exception.37 Rather,
“equality of treatment is . . . the beginning, not the end, of
the Supremacy Clause analysis.”38 To get to the end of the
analysis, it is necessary to move beyond equal treatment and
consider whether the rule in question is truly jurisdictional
in the sense that it "reflect[s] the concerns of power over the
person and competence over the subject matter."39 In other
words, the phrase “neutral rule of judicial administration”
embodies a requirement not just that the rule be neutral, but
also that it be a rule of judicial administration. It was on
this latter point that the majority concluded that the New
York rule invoked in Haywood was problematic. Although
framed in terms of jurisdiction, Stevens viewed the rule as a
reflection of a desire to provide substantive immunity to
prison officials.40 Viewed that way, the application of the
state rule was in clear violation not of the commandeering
line of cases, but of the first category of cases discussed
above. For federal claims, federal law must provide the rules
of decision, and resort to some other body of law is to treat
the federal law as something less than supreme.
For all of these decisions, the Court seems motivated
by dual concerns about discrimination and interference. A
state court almost certainly runs into trouble if it applies a
rule to a federal claim that it would not apply to an
analogous state claim.41 This is true whether the rule
invoked is procedural or jurisdictional. In either case, the
state's behavior is considered discriminatory, and such
behavior can never be justified under existing doctrine. But
even if the state's behavior is not discriminatory, it may
37
38

Id. at 2116.
Id.

Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 381 (1990).
See Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2118 (characterizing the rule as
“effectively an immunity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb” and
concluding that the “Supremacy Clause cannot be evaded by formalism”).
41 See id. at 2117 n.6.
39
40
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nevertheless be problematic if it interferes with federal
objectives.
The use of neutral state rules—whether
procedural or jurisdictional as a matter of form—is
acceptable only when those rules do not undermine federal
interests in either intent or effect.
B. Horizontal Cases
State courts are involved in horizontal federalism
when they are asked to decide state law claims involving
contacts with sister states.42 In such cases, the body of law
being applied is state law, but there are federal
constitutional constraints that structure the way that law is
selected and applied. Specifically, Section 1 of Article IV
provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State.”43 This provision imposes obligations on
state courts to treat state claims with multistate contacts in
a certain way.44
For a relatively brief time, the Supreme Court
experimented with a reading of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause that would have given those obligations significant
bite. In Alaska Packers, the Court upheld a decision by a
California court to apply its own law to an employment
dispute involving both California and Alaska contacts.45 But

Even if they choose to apply their own law, there is still an element
of horizontal federalism present when a state decides a case involving
multistate contacts.
43 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
44 The Due Process clause also imposes constraints in this situation.
However, because the Court has developed a unified approach to the
constitutional constraints on a state's horizontal choice of law—see
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307–08 (1981)—and because the
other constraints discussed here arise out of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, I will focus on Full Faith and Credit. See Kermit Roosevelt III,
The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448,
2506–07 (1999).
45 Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S.
532, 550 (1935). California was the site of the employment contract and
42
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the Court made clear that if its analysis had led it to
conclude that Alaska's interest was greater, the choice of
California law would have been problematic.46 In other
words, Alaska Packers suggested strongly that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause mandated the selection of the law of the
state with the most significant interest, and that the
ultimate responsibility for assessing the competing interests
rested with the Court itself.47
Almost immediately, however, the Court stepped back
from that stance, and the choice-of-law obligations arising
from the Full Faith and Credit Clause have been weak ever
since.48 Under the current approach, a horizontal choice of
law is constitutionally permissible so long as the state whose
law is chosen has a significant interest in the case.49 As we
shall see, this is not an altogether toothless formulation, but
it provides states with significant flexibility in their choice of
law analysis. In moving from Alaska Packers to Allstate, the
Court “rejected the siren song of balancing for the comfort of
the domicile of the plaintiff. Id. at 537–38. Performance, however,
occurred in Alaska, as well as the plaintiff’s injuries sued on. Id.
46 Id. at 549.
47 The Alaska Packers decision may be seen as a retreat from earlier
Court opinions that promoted a more territorial view of state-state
conflicts, one that constitutionalized the traditional “vested rights” theory
of conflicts.
Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law:
Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2505 (1999). However, if
one subscribes fully to the territorial theories of Beale, it becomes clear
that Alaska Packers was not so much a retreat as a sidestep: it
acknowledged that state statutes could conflict in disposing of a case,
whereas Beale found that, since no state laws had extraterritorial effects,
no conflicts ever truly exist. Id. at 2504–05.
48 See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal.,
306 U.S. 493, 502–03 (1939) (finding “little room for [the full faith and
credit compulsion to recognize or enforce a sister state’s law] when the
statute of the forum is the expression of domestic policy, in terms
declared to be exclusive in its application to persons and events within
the state”); Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947)
(requiring only “some substantial connection between the [state] and the
particular employee-employer relationship” governed by the statute at
issue, and rejecting the necessity of “the fortuitous circumstance” that the
forum state be “the place of [the plaintiff’s] work or injury”).
49 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312–13.
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minimal scrutiny.”50
The scrutiny under the modern
approach may be fairly characterized as minimal in part
because it is weak. Any “significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests” will do.51
But the scrutiny is also minimal in the sense that it is
focused exclusively on the ultimate results of the choice of
law analysis. That is, the Court applies its weak test only to
assess the relationship between the case and the state whose
law is chosen.52 But as to the process by which that initial
choice is made, the Court has essentially declared that the
Constitution is uninterested.53
One of the implications of this framework is that the
public policy exception, a choice of law doctrine that looks
facially suspicious, escapes constitutional scrutiny. Public
policy exceptions have long been stalwarts of choice of law
analysis, and they were folded into state practice in the
United States without much consideration or controversy.54
They operate essentially to override a choice of law that
would otherwise be made on the grounds that the law
selected is somehow offensive or undesirable.55 And although
the classic formulation of the doctrine resulted in dismissal
Richman & Reynolds, Full Faith and Credit 43
Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313.
52 Id.; compare Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 819–
820, 822 (1985) (reversing Kansas Supreme Court’s application of Kansas
law where the state lacked sufficient “interest” in the case), with Sun Oil
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (concluding that Kansas courts
may apply their own statute of limitations to multistate claims because of
Kansas’s interest in “regulating the work load of its courts and
determining when a claim is too stale to be adjudicated”).
53 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 307 (concluding that it was “not for this Court”
to assess the “choice-of-law analysis,” but instead focusing on whether the
“choice” made comported with constitutional limits).
54 Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1971–72
(1997).
55 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918) (finding
that a law may be refused under the public policy exception where its
application “would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal”).
50
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on jurisdictional grounds,56 it has long been common for
states to invoke the doctrine to justify a substitution of some
other law—almost always forum law.57 It at least has an
appearance of oddity for one state of our union to refuse
application of the law of another state based on a judgment
about the competing law's content.58 Indeed, Larry Kramer
has provocatively suggested that such a refusal is not simply
odd, but is in fundamental and unavoidable tension with the
core of what the Full Faith and Credit Clause was designed
to accomplish.59 Even so, the Supreme Court has never
seriously questioned the exception.
Under the current
approach, the mechanism of the public policy doctrine is
never directly assessed because it is considered merely a part
of the analysis that produces the choice. And the choice itself
is all that matters; mechanisms are outside the scope of the
Court's concern.60
Despite the minimal nature of the Court's review of
horizontal choice of law decisions, some limitations have
emerged. The most straightforward and predictable of these
is that the selection of the law of a state that has no
significant relationship to a claim will be rejected. So in
Shutts, a Kansas state court violated constitutional
Id. (courts cannot “close their doors” unless the offensive law
violates public policy).
57 Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the
Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 979–80 (1956).
58 Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1972
(1997) (emphasizing that the doctrine is "a content-based principle").
59 Id. at 1980; Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy”
in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 1008–10 (1956) (noting
that using the public policy exception as a residual equity principle to
avoid injustice in individual cases is “dangerous”); but see Richard S.
Myers, Same-Sex “Marriage” and the Public Policy Doctrine , 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 45, 56–57 (1998).
60 See supra note 53. Indeed, the Court was unwilling to call the
public policy exception into question even when it embraced balancing.
Alaska Packers simultaneously concluded that a decision to apply forum
law could be sustained on a finding that the foreign law was offensive to
forum policy. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal.,
294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
56

Reverse Abstention

17

constraints when it applied its own law to certain claims
brought by non-Kansans against a Delaware defendant to
recover interest on royalty payments arising from the
ownership of land outside Kansas.61 Aside from the fact that
they had been filed there, Kansas had no connection at all to
those out-of-state claims, and thus the selection failed even a
weak test applied only to the results of the choice of law
process.62 But Shutts is notable not just for its enforcement
of the constitutional constraint on choice of law; it is also
noteworthy for the rarity of that result.63
The second limitation is somewhat more complex. In a
series of cases—most notably Hughes v. Fetter—the Court
has read the Full Faith and Credit Clause to constrain a
state court's power to reject claims that arise out of the law of
another state.64 Hughes is a confusing case, and it is
frequently viewed as enigmatic or a sport.65 Nevertheless, an
understanding of the case helps to clarify the underlying
principle that the Court has developed in cases implicating
horizontal federalism. Hughes and Fetter were in a car
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799–803 (1985).
Id. at 822.
63 See, e.g., In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1031–32 (Kan. 2007)
(finding under Shutts and Allstate that Kansas, as the domicile of both
parties, had contacts sufficient to warrant application of its own law);
Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Posey, 146 S.W.3d 302, 317 (Tex. App.
2004) (finding that Texas had sufficient contacts to satisfy full faith and
credit because the plaintiffs were Texas residents and the contract was
executed there); see also Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 292, 305
n.13 (Mich. 1987) (noting that the limitations on choice of law imposed by
Allstate and Shutts are “rather meager”); Arons v. Rite Aid Corp., 2005
WL 975462 (N.J. 2005)(unpublished opinion).
64 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612–13 (1951); Broderick v. Rosner,
294 U.S. 629, 642–43 (1935); First Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 307–98 (1952).
65 See Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the “Transitory” Cause
of Action, 73 HARV. L. REV. 36, 36 (1959); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex
61
62

Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy
Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1980–81 (1997) (labeling Justice Black’s
opinion “short” and “impressionistic”); Lea Brilmayer, Credit Due
Judgments and Credit Due Laws: The Respective Roles of Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit in the Interstate Context , 70 IOWA L. REV. 95,
109 (1984).
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accident in Illinois; Hughes died, and the administrator of
his estate filed a wrongful death action against Fetter (and
his insurer) in Wisconsin.66
Wisconsin was an
understandable forum because all relevant parties were from
there. Even so, recovery was sought under the Illinois
wrongful death statute, primarily because the Wisconsin
statute permitted recovery only for deaths within the state.67
But recovery was denied, and the case was dismissed on the
merits, because the Wisconsin state court interpreted its
wrongful death statute as establishing “a local public policy
against Wisconsin's entertaining suits brought under the
wrongful death statutes of other states.”68
Justice Black might have concluded that the dismissal
in Hughes was problematic because the interest of Illinois
was greater than the interest of Wisconsin, and thus full
faith and credit precluded Wisconsin from applying its own
law to the claim. But by the time Hughes was decided, the
Supreme Court had abandoned a balancing approach to full
faith and credit, and the proper question would therefore
have been whether Wisconsin had a significant interest in
the case. The answer to that question was certainly yes;
indeed, Black conceded as much.69 But if Wisconsin had an
interest that justified the application of its own law, what
precisely was the problem with the dismissal? The problem
was that Wisconsin did not actually apply its own law to the
claim. Instead, it invoked the Wisconsin wrongful death
statute only as evidence of a state policy against deciding
claims arising under foreign law. It was that state policy,
and not the substantive limitations of Wisconsin's statute,
that mandated dismissal.
Put differently, Wisconsin's
conclusion was not that its own law should be applied, but
that the law of Illinois could not be.
At this point, one can begin to understand the
confusion wrought by Hughes. It seems strange that the full
Hughes, 341 U.S. at 610.
Id. at 610 n.2.
68 Id. at 610.
69 Id. at 611–12, 612 n. 10.
66
67
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faith and credit problem stems not from the result—
dismissal—but from the means by which the result was
reached. It seems stranger still that the use of a public
policy exception to support the selection of Wisconsin law
would have been sustained, while the use of what is
essentially a jurisdictional rule rooted in public policy was
rejected.70 But properly understood, the case is not as
strange as it seems. What cases like Pacific Employers
established was that the Supreme Court is unwilling to
police the mechanics of the choice of law process; it will focus
merely on outputs. But the output of the choice of law
process in Hughes was that Illinois should govern.
Wisconsin then refused to heed the outcome of its own choiceof-law analysis based on a separate policy that required the
rejection of non-Wisconsin claims. It was precisely the
separate, or exogenous, nature of the Wisconsin policy that
triggered the constitutional defect.71 What Hughes stands
for, then—and what it adds to the framework established
above—is that the use of such a separate policy to override a
choice of law is unacceptable. If Wisconsin's choice-of-law
analysis had concluded with a selection of Wisconsin law, the
court would have heard the claim. But since Wisconsin's
analysis concluded with a selection of non-Wisconsin law, the
court rejected the claim. These results create a “basic
conflict” with the “strong unifying principle embodied in the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.”72 So it remains true even
after Hughes that the Supreme Court will look only at the
result of the choice of law analysis, and will not venture into
a consideration of choice-of-law mechanisms. At the same
time, once the analysis yields a result, the state is compelled

See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1983–84
(1997) (arguing that Hughes supports a conclusion that the public policy
70

doctrine is constitutionally suspect because it is discriminatory).
71 That makes Hughes quite different from a case where public policy
is considered in a way that is endogenous to the choice-of-law analysis.
72 Hughes, 341 U.S. at 612.
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to follow it, and the application of an exogenous rule that is
sensitive to the result is constitutionally suspect.73
It is in this sense that Hughes embodies an
antidiscrimination principle.74
Indeed, the Court has
characterized its opinion in precisely those terms. Just two
years after Hughes, the Court described as its “crucial factor”
that “the forum laid an uneven hand on causes of action
arising within and without the forum state. Causes of action
arising in sister states were discriminated against.”75 As
such, Hughes is a kindred spirit to the cases in the vertical
federalism setting that limit the ability of states to refuse to
hear federal cases based on rules that are not equally
applicable to federal and non-federal claims.76 Stating the
Moreover, it does not matter whether the exogenous rule is framed
in terms of affecting jurisdiction (as in Hughes) or available remedies.
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642–43 (1935) (finding that a state
“may not, under the guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny the
enforcement of claims otherwise within the protection of the full faith and
credit clause”). At the very least, if it does make its selection on the basis
of such a rule, that decision must pass something akin to an intermediate
scrutiny. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and
the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1984
(1997). The application of an exogenous rule that applies equally
regardless of the outcome of the choice-of-law analysis would not trigger
the same constitutional concerns. Then again, if such a rule were in
place, it would not be necessary for the state to even conduct a choice-oflaw analysis before applying it.
74 Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1984
(1997) (describing Hughes in antidiscrimination terms); Kermit Roosevelt
III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts , 97 MICH. L. REV.
2448, 2511–15 (1999) (same).
75 Wells v. Simons Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 518–19 (1953). This
formulation can be read to support a distinction between Hughes and
cases based on the public policy exception, at least insofar as the latter
would lead the state to conclude that the cause of action actually arose
under its own law.
76 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. The antidiscrimination
principle in the vertical setting is clearly stronger. Whereas a facially
neutral jurisdictional rule would likely pass muster in the horizontal
setting, cases like Haywood make clear that even facially neutral rules
may pose constitutional problems if they discriminate against federal law
in their effect. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
73
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rule broadly to encompass both situations, we might say that
if a state opens its courts to a certain type of claim, those
courts must be open to hearing that claim regardless of the
source of law.77
II. QUESTIONING THE OLD MODEL
The model of judicial federalism that the Supreme
Court has developed is based almost exclusively on
considerations of discrimination and interference. This is not
to say that the analysis is identical in the horizontal and
vertical contexts. The constitutional provisions associated
with those two contexts are different, and the analysis is
understandably sensitive to that difference. But both lines of
It may be unclear whether the constitutional obligations to apply
federal procedure in the vertical context also apply in the horizontal
context. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 24 (1910) (“[A]lthough mere modes
of execution provided by the laws of a state in which a judgment is
rendered are not, by operation of the full faith and credit clause,
obligatory upon the courts of another state in which the judgment is
sought to be enforced, nevertheless, if the judgment be an enforceable
judgment in the state where rendered, the duty to give effect to it in
another state clearly results from the full faith and credit clause,
although the modes of procedure to enforce the collection may not be the
same in both states.”); Bowles v. J.J. Schmitt & Co., 170 F.2d 617, 622 n.6
(2d Cir. 1948) (finding that sister-state judgments should be enforced
“whatever the local procedure”). However, modern discussion by the
Court and Circuits seems to find that the obligation does not apply to the
horizontal arena. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726–29
(1988) (holding that constitutionalizing choice-of-law rules would be
undesirable
and
that
even
if
certain
substance/procedure
characterizations under state law may be “unwise,” they are not thereby
“unconstitutional”); Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S.
222, 235 (1998) (“Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that
States must adopt the practices of other States regarding the time,
manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforcement
measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive
effects do; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of
forum law.”); Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 560 (2d
Cir. 1962) (rejecting the notion that the “incidents” of a sister state’s
claim must be enforced when the forum gives full faith and credit to the
claim itself).
77
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cases can be usefully cast in terms of discrimination and
interference.
In this Part, I question the continuing
emphasis on those two factors. A decision to refuse a case—
whether state or federal—has long been considered a form of
interference that raises constitutional concerns. But while it
may at one point have been true that such a refusal would
result in meaningful interference, there are reasons to think
that that may no longer be the case.
In terms of
discrimination, the Court has been generally unwilling to
accept jurisdictional or procedural rules that distinguish
between forum-based claims and other claims. Recently,
however, Justice Thomas has articulated a vision of the
Supremacy Clause in the vertical context that suggests that,
at least for jurisdictional rules, discrimination should be
tolerated.78 That vision is not wholly persuasive, but it
points the way toward a new thinking of judicial federalism
that might better balance the power of states to control their
judicial systems and the need to respect federal and sister
state claims.
A. Rethinking Interference

1. Vertical Cases
Much of the discussion concerning the federal power to
commandeer state courts centers around the original
understanding of the authority given to Congress in the
"ordain and establish" clause of the Constitution.79 This
clause is the product of the so-called Madisonian
Compromise, struck between those like Madison who wanted
See Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2132 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
79 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The State Judges Clause has also been
cited as a basis for commandeering, though perhaps with less persuasive
force. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; compare Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash,
Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957, 2011–13 (1993), with
Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer
State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism , 32 IND.
L. REV. 71, 81 (1998).
78
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to create lower federal courts and those like Rutledge who
viewed their creation as unnecessary and even dangerous.80
Rather than resolve that disagreement definitively, the
Constitution as ratified created only one federal court—the
Supreme Court—but gave Congress power to create others.81
In essence, then, the question of whether a system of inferior
federal courts should be established was deferred and deconstitutionalized with the inclusion of the "ordain and
establish" language.82
At the same time, the Constitution conferred original
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court that was quite limited.83
This meant that many cases falling within the "judicial
Power of the United States" described in Article III, and
particularly those "arising under . . . the Laws of the United
States," did not fall within the Court's original jurisdiction.84
The fact that the Constitution provided no guarantee that
federal claims could be adjudicated in a federal forum has led
to an assertion that the Framers must have contemplated
that state courts would be available for those claims.85
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 124 (Max
Farrand ed., 1937).
81 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
82 Beyond the fact of their creation, some constitutional concerns
remain in play when considering Article III courts. For instance, the old
adage that “the greater power includes the lesser” has been used to argue
that Congress may strip jurisdiction from lower federal courts merely
because it gave them the power in the first place. Peter J. Smith,
Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1892–93 (2008).
However, this structural argument is fundamentally misguided,
particularly when considering important remedies associated with vital
constitutional rights. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping
Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1134 (2010) (“Congress cannot use its
power to control jurisdiction to preclude constitutionally necessary
remedies for the violation of constitutional rights.”).
83 Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1363 (2003).
84 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
85 Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1257, 1263 (2011); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office
Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2021 (1993); see also James E. Pfander,
80

Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 216
(concluding that Hamilton held Article III to allow Congress to
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Indeed, the claim is even stronger than that, for it
encompasses not just the idea that state courts would be
available, but that state courts could be made to be
available.86 In short, the argument is that the original
design of the Constitution contains within it a provision for
the commandeering of state courts.87
Building on claims rooted in constitutional design,
supporters of a broad commandeering power next move to
early Congressional practice. Congress quickly exercised its
power to create lower federal courts, but the jurisdiction
conferred on those courts was initially limited.88 Congress
did not see fit to confer general federal question jurisdiction
on the lower federal courts until 1875.89
This is said to
provide additional evidence for the proposition that state
“constitute” the state courts as inferior federal tribunals); but see Michael
G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 40, 55 (1995) (arguing that these
jurisdictional gaps represented “enclaves” of exclusively federal
jurisdiction that compelled the creation of lower federal courts).
86 States could not escape this compulsion even by the extreme
measure of abolishing their judiciary entirely. Vicki C. Jackson, Printz
and Testa: The Infrastructure of Federal Supremacy , 32 IND. L. REV.
111, 113 (1998); see also Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office
Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2012 (1993) (arguing that the
Constitution forces state judges to serve as instruments of federal
government). Thus Hart’s refrain that Congress takes state courts as it
finds them may not actually reach its furthest logical extension.
87 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1957, 2022 (1993) (“Our Constitution, since it presumes federal
jurisdiction for state courts, itself commandeers state courts.”).
88 Perhaps clearest example is the limited nature of federal
jurisdiction granted in the Judiciary Act of 1789, in which Congress
created jurisdictional gaps that denied federal review of federal questions
in certain cases, imposed an amount-in-controversy requirement, and
rejected any notion of general federal question jurisdiction. Paul Taylor,

Congress’s Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First
Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today’s Congress and
Courts, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 847, 861–63, 876–80 (2010).

Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. The Midnight Judges
Act of 1801 attempted to create federal-question jurisdiction, see Act of
Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, but it was soon repealed by the
Jeffersonian Republican Congress, which was distrustful of a powerful
federal government. See Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132.
89
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courts were understood to be both competent and obligated to
hear federal claims.90 If state courts did not hear federal
claims not included within a federal jurisdictional statute, no
court would. As a matter of necessity, then, Congress must
have had the power to allocate certain federal claims to state
courts. And if that power existed prior to the creation of
general federal question jurisdiction, then it must also exist
now.91
The vestiges of the Madisonian Compromise have
carried over to modern discussions about the scope of the
federal commandeering power. In Printz, for example,
Justice Scalia rehearsed many of the arguments associated
with constitutional structure and early congressional
practice to support his assertion that federal commandeering
of state judiciaries could be easily distinguished from federal
commandeering of state legislatures or executives.92 But the
Madisonian Compromise grew out of uncertainty that has
been resolved definitively for more than a century.93 That
Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the
Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 47 (1995) (since federal
90

courts are merely optional under the Constitution, “there was a
possibility that state courts would be the exclusive adjudicators of federal
questions and enforcers of federal rights in the first instance.”).
91 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 339 (1816) (noting that
state courts must logically hear federal claims if Congress decided not to
constitute lower federal courts and the Supreme Court would have only
appellate jurisdiction in the case); Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional

Limitations on Congress’s Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 21–22 (1981) (acknowledging

Congress’s power to strip jurisdiction from federal tribunals, but noting
the sometimes serious constitutional considerations that limit its
discretion in jurisdiction stripping).
92 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907-08 (1997).
Justice
Scalia’s constitutional argument emphasized the "state judges" language
in the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 907.
93 Indeed, the Framers themselves anticipated and welcomed the
eventual resolution of their misgivings embodied in the Madisonian
Compromise. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) (urging that the answers to the errors inherent in the
Constitution “will not be ascertained until an actual trial shall have
pointed them out”); THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
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resolution may alter the way that we should think about the
interaction of state and federal courts today. Put differently,
it may be true that the system of lower federal courts took
time to develop, and that Congress did not confer general
federal question jurisdiction on those lower courts until 1875.
But it is also true that the system of lower federal courts is
now firmly established, that their jurisdiction is stable, and
that it is difficult to imagine that that state of affairs will
change anytime soon.94
The existence of a developed and secure system of
federal courts has implications for the effects produced by the
treatment (or mistreatment) of federal claims by state courts.
In the nineteenth century, a decision by a state court to
refuse a case rooted in federal law would seriously
undermine a plaintiff’s ability to pursue the federal claim. A
plaintiff in that position might have been able to take the
claim to the courts of a different state that was more
amenable to federal cases. But territorial restrictions on
personal jurisdiction would have made that a difficult
proposition in many cases,95 and even where such a move
was possible, the burden imposed on the plaintiff would often
be severe.96 In terms of practical effect, then, a state court’s
refusal to entertain a federal claim would often be the
equivalent of a decision to extinguish the claim altogether.
Today, by contrast, the same refusal has far less pernicious
consequences. If a federal claim is refused by a state court, a
plaintiff may take the action to federal court, and the subject
E. Cooke ed., 1961) (observing that “‘[t]is time only that can mature and
perfect so compound a system”).
94 Modern jurisdiction-stripping bills do not challenge the federal
courts’ broad and entrenched federal-question jurisdiction. Howard M.
Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Non-Extant Rights, 56 U. KAN. L.
REV. 227, 229 (2008).
95
Broad minimum-contacts doctrines, established later in
International Shoe, would not have been available to the litigious
nineteenth-century American. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1877) (requiring consent, domicile, or service of process in the forum
state to gain personal jurisdiction over a defendant).
96 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 124 (Max
Farrand ed., 1937).
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matter jurisdiction provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, together
with the personal jurisdiction provided by Rule 4(k)(1)(A), all
but ensures that the doors of the federal court will be open.97
To be sure, the move from state to federal court may carry
with it some inconvenience.98 But it is almost inconceivable
that a non-prejudicial dismissal of a federal claim by a state
court would have the practical effect of rendering the federal
claim unenforceable.

2. Horizontal Cases
Perhaps the most well-known formulation of the public
policy exception in choice of law comes from then-Judge
Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.99 Loucks was from
New York, but was killed while traveling in
Massachusetts.100 His relatives brought an action in New
York seeking recovery, and argued that a Massachusetts
statute limiting recovery should not be applied.101 Cardozo
conceded that as the place of injury, the law of
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). If for some
reason the plaintiff is determined to remain in state court, then the more
flexible personal jurisdiction doctrines under the regime initiated by
International Shoe make it more likely that another state court could
acquire personal jurisdiction over the defendant and decide the federal
claim. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–94 (1980);
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). For
further discussion of the role of developments in the domain of personal
jurisdiction, see infra notes 110–111 and accompanying text.
98 These inconveniences primarily involve the burden of refiling, but
may include increased burdens on plaintiffs in the areas of pleading and
summary judgment. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555–56 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88
(1986); Bias v. Advantage Intern., Inc., 905 F.2d 1558, 1561 (D.C. Cir.
1990). However, they do not categorically rule out a plaintiff’s claim, and
every day plaintiffs meet and overcome these obstacles in asserting rights
in federal courts.
99 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
97

100
101

Id.
Id.
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Massachusetts would normally be selected, and he
acknowledged that Massachusetts law differed from that of
New York, which had no cap on damages.102 But he then
concluded that it would nevertheless be inappropriate to
refuse the application of the Massachusetts law on grounds
of public policy.103 In his words, such a refusal should occur
only when the application of foreign law “would violate some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal.”104
Loucks is notable in part because it articulates an
exception that is narrow and would be triggered only
rarely.105 Mere disagreements with the policy choices made
by sister states are insufficient under his formulation. But it
is notable also because it frames the exception explicitly as
one that implicates the court’s jurisdiction.106 That is, a
finding that a foreign law violates the public policy of the
forum state would result in a dismissal of the case on
jurisdictional grounds. To Cardozo, the choice in Loucks was
to apply Massachusetts law or to decline the case altogether.
At the time that Loucks was decided, the jurisdictional
nature of the public policy exception meant that its
invocation would often have serious implications for the
status of the claim. Obviously, dismissal would mean that
the claim could not be brought in the forum state. But due to
the territorial nature of the personal jurisdiction doctrine,107
it could also mean that the claim could not be brought at all.
Loucks is illustrative here. The plaintiffs, administrators of
Loucks’s estate, were undoubtedly attracted to New York as
Id. at 201.
Id. at 202.
104 Loucks, 120 N.E. at 202.
105 Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1972–73
102
103

(1997).

Loucks, 120 N.E. at 200 (“Even though the statute is not penal, it
differs from our own. We must determine whether the difference is a
sufficient reason for declining jurisdiction.”)
107 See supra note 95.
106
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a convenient forum for the suit. But New York was a proper
forum only because the defendant, Standard Oil, was also
from New York and so could be served there. Were the New
York courts to refuse to hear the claim, the resulting
dismissal would have been without prejudice, leaving the
plaintiffs free to take the claim to a state willing to apply the
Massachusetts law. Massachusetts, of course, would be the
most likely candidate, but acquiring personal jurisdiction
over the defendant there may have presented a challenge.
Perhaps Massachusetts would have been willing to bend
Pennoyer’s “presence” or “consent” requirements in an effort
to reach Standard Oil,108 but it is at least conceivable that
jurisdiction would be found lacking.
Indeed, in cases involving individuals rather than
corporations, it is even easier to imagine that the state of the
defendant’s residence would be the only available forum from
the standpoint of personal jurisdiction. To use an example
familiar to conflicts scholars, consider a suit by an injured
West Virginia passenger against a West Virginia driver
stemming from an automobile accident occurring in Indiana.
Indiana permits recoveries by guests, but West Virginia does
not. Under the First Restatement, Indiana law should apply
as the place of injury, but West Virginia might conclude that
permitting recovery would violate the public policy of the
forum.109 If the court dismissed jurisdictionally, it would
essentially be delivering the message that although West
Virginia would play no part, Indiana remains free to enforce
its own law and vindicate the claim. But unless the
defendant returned to Indiana (and based on how the first
trip went, return might be unlikely), that resolution provides
See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (allowing implied
consent in an automobile accident case to suffice under Pennoyer and
Fourteenth-Amendment due process).
109 This conclusion would not appear to be consistent with Judge
Cardozo’s formulation of a narrow public policy exception in Loucks. But
for an example of a West Virginia court reaching such a conclusion on the
basis of the reverse legal situation, see Paul v. Nat’l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550,
556 (W. Va. 1986) (refusing to apply an Indiana guest statute on the basis
of public policy).
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little relief to the injured plaintiff. In terms of practical
effect, the public policy dismissal is a death knell. The
plaintiff would be released to take the claim elsewhere, but
that is cold comfort when there is nowhere else to go.
Another way of putting this point is that the limited
scope of the prevailing personal jurisdiction doctrine in the
early twentieth century meant that there was a very
practical need for states to be willing to enforce claims based
on the laws of other states. Causes of action needed to be
transitory because they would otherwise not be subject to
enforcement in many cases. This strong practical need has
diminished over time, however. With the advent of the
modern “minimum contacts” approach to personal
jurisdiction,110 the case where a cause of action rejected on
public policy grounds could not be re-filed in the state whose
law was refused is increasingly rare.111 Both cases described
above demonstrate the point. In Loucks, the decision by
Standard Oil to send an employee into Massachusetts would
almost be certain to create a basis for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction there. And in the hypothetical guest statute
case, the defendant’s vehicular misadventures in the state of
Indiana would certainly be enough to permit the plaintiff’s
suit to be re-filed there.
B. Rethinking Discrimination
Since at least 1934, the Supreme Court has
consistently found that a state may not discriminate against
federal claims, regardless of whether the discrimination

110

See supra note 97.

Rare, but perhaps not non-existent. To the contrary, there still
may from time to time be situations where a dismissal by one state would
threaten the plaintiff’s ability to bring the action. See, e.g., Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84,
98 (1978); some cases involving a forum selection clause; renvoi
situations (where each state would choose the other but invoke public
policy exception).
111
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takes a substantive, procedural, or jurisdictional form.112 In
Haywood v. Drown, Justice Thomas wrote a lengthy solo
dissent arguing that this strong antidiscrimination principle
is misguided.113 According to Thomas, two separate areas of
the Constitution—the definition of federal judicial power in
Article III and the Supremacy Clause in Article VI—have
been relied on to establish the rule applied in cases like
McKnett, Testa, and Haywood itself.114
But properly
understood, neither upsets the fundamental sovereign power
of each state to define for itself which cases its courts will
hear and decide.115 To the extent that states introduce rules
in the form of a jurisdictional bar, “it is the end of the matter
as far as the Constitution is concerned.”116 And that is true
even if the trigger for the jurisdictional bar is the federal
nature of the claim.
Begin then with Article III.
For Thomas, the
Madisonian Compromise concerns the creation of lower
federal courts, and does not affect the scope of state power.117
The power to ordain and establish lower federal courts does
not imply that state courts are automatically incompetent to
decide claims arising under federal law, and the decisions
confirming the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction
correctly reflect that understanding.118 But it is just as true
that the power to ordain and establish lower federal courts
does not imply that state courts are automatically competent
to decide claims arising under federal law. That is so for a
simple reason–state courts are not lower federal courts, and
See generally McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230
(overturning an Alabama procedural rule that deprived its courts of
jurisdiction over claims arising in other jurisdictions).
113 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2131 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“To read the
Supremacy Clause to include an anti-discrimination principle
undermines the compromise that shaped Article III and contradicts the
original understanding of the Constitution.”)
114 Id. at 2118.
115 Id. at 2122, 2126.
116 Id. at 2122.
117 Id. at 2120.
118 See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 90 U.S. 130, 136 (1876); Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
112

Reverse Abstention

32

the decision to exercise (or not) the powers created under
Article III therefore do not reach them. In short, the
Madisonian Compromise grants to Congress power to
develop the lower federal courts, but it leaves in place the
existing right of states to develop their own courts.119
Because that latter power includes the power to close courts
to certain claims, “States have unfettered authority to
determine whether their local courts may entertain a federal
cause of action.”120
Nor is this understanding inconsistent with the
Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause requires that
federal law be applied as a rule of decision when courts
decide federal claims.121 That is, it provides the authority for
preemption and serves to “disable state laws that are
substantively inconsistent with federal law.”122 But the
Supremacy Clause says nothing about when courts must
hear federal claims.123 In essence, it is a choice of law rule
rather than a jurisdictional one. This does not mean that
any non-prejudicial dismissal of a federal claim is
permissible, however. Once a state extends its normal
jurisdiction to a federal claim, the state is bound to exercise
the jurisdiction it provided. A case-specific decision not to
hear the federal claim amounts to a disagreement with the
federal law, and that kind of decision violates supremacy
principles.124 But so long as a state declines a federal claim
based on its own jurisdictional rules, the supremacy of
federal law is not implicated.125 Whether the jurisdictional
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 821
(1824); Stearns v. United States, 22 F. Cas. 1188, 1192 (1835); Mitchell v.
Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 499 (1843); 1 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 374–375 (1826).
120 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2122 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
121 Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the
Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 144, 178 (1995)
122 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2124 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 2123.
124 Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 55 (1912);
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947).
125 There is still a significant amount of theoretical difficulty in
distinguishing jurisdictional rules of the Douglas variety, Douglas v. New
119
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rule singles out federal law or discriminates with respect to
federal claims is beside the point.126
According to Thomas, this understanding of state
power changed when the Supreme Court decided McKnett.127
Unlike Mondou, the state court in McKnett did not have
subject matter jurisdiction to hear FELA claims.128 On
Thomas’s understanding, that fact alone should have
determined the case. “Alabama had exercised its sovereign
right to establish the subject-matter jurisdiction of its
courts,” and “that legislative judgment should have been
upheld.”129 Instead, the Court imposed an antidiscrimination
principle and struck down the jurisdictional limitation
because it was “based solely upon the source of law sought to
be enforced.”130 After McKnett, the idea that “[a] state may
not discriminate against rights arising under federal laws”
became standard fare in cases involving federal claims in
state courts, even in cases where it was not strictly
necessary.131 Ultimately, that idea played a central role in
overruling the New York jurisdictional rule in Haywood.132
Preserving New York’s sovereign power—as understood by
Thomas—would have required that the jurisdictional bar be
York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387–88 (1929), and discretionary
rules such as the one rejected in Mondou. Thomas seems to appreciate
the importance of that conceptual task, arguing extensively that a rule
should be respected as jurisdictional when it “operate[s] jurisidictionally.”
Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2134–36 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).
126 This is a point of a distinction between the Supremacy and Full
Faith and Credit Clauses. As Thomas notes, the “textual prohibition on
discrimination” in the Full Faith and Credit Clause actively prohibits
states from discriminating against sister-state claims. Haywood, 129 S.
Ct. at 2125 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, the Supremacy Clause
simultaneously allows jurisdictional discrimination while it prohibits
interference with proper disposition according to federal law once
jurisdiction is accepted.
127 McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
128 Id. at 230.
129 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2128 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
130 McKnett, 292 U.S. at 233–34.
131 Id. at 234; see Testa, Howlett, Johnson v. Fankell.
132 See Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2117.
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upheld, even if it were motivated by hostility to the policies
embedded in federal law.
Toward the end of his Haywood dissent, Thomas also
suggests a different way of thinking about procedural rules.
Unlike jurisdictional rules, the Supremacy Clause does
provide authority for federally created procedures to preempt
state procedures.133 Once a state decides to open its doors to
hear a federal claim, it must do so in a way that honors the
supremacy of federal law. But procedural preemption should
not be triggered merely because the use of a state procedure
would impose a burden on the exercise of a federal right.134
Thus, the line of cases including Felder that turn on the
degree of interference with federal claims should be
eliminated.135 In its place, the Court should employ an
analysis that focuses on whether a federal procedure was
created to further particular substantive federal rights. Such
procedures should carry over from federal court to state court
if the federal right to which they are attached is implicated
in state court. But procedures lacking a specific connection
to substantive federal rights or a specific direction regarding
their applicability in state courts should be understood as
applicable only in the federal courts.136 A decision to infer
See, e.g., Brown v. W. Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1949); Dice v.
Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952); see also
Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer
State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism , 32 IND.
L. REV. 71, 105–108 (1998) (suggesting a strong presumption in favor
federal procedure, except where such procedure would require a
“significant attenuation in the structure of the state judicial system”).
134 Haywood, 129 S. Ct.. at 2133 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Supremacy Clause supplies this Court with no authority to pre-empt a
state procedural law merely because it ‘burdens the exercise’ of a federal
right in state court.”).
135 See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138–141 (1988).
136 Vicki C. Jackson, Printz and Testa: The Infrastructure of Federal
Supremacy, 32 IND. L. REV. 111, 129–30 (1998) (arguing that federal
procedures “bound up with” the federal right may apply, but that this
does not necessitate that Congress may impose any procedure on the
states, which would be an impermissible application of Congress’s
Necessary and Proper power to the states).
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preemption with respect to those procedures would be
“illegitimate—and unconstitutional.”137
In sum, Thomas’s view of vertical judicial federalism
largely de-emphasizes discrimination in favor of a formalistic
focus on the nature of the rules in question. When a federal
claim is filed in state court, the ability of the state court to
apply its rules rather than federal rules depends on whether
the rule in question is substantive, procedural, or
jurisdictional. If the rule is substantive, the federal rule
must be applied, at least in cases where the federal law
preempts competing state laws. If the rule is procedural,
then a state should be free to apply its own procedures unless
Congress provides a specific and valid direction that a
federally created procedure must be applied. The fact that
state and federal procedures differ, or that the application of
the state procedure will burden the federal right, is not
enough. Finally, if the state rule is jurisdictional, the state
rule may always be applied.
III. DEVELOPING THE NEW MODEL
The previous Part questioned the factors that motivate
the Supreme Court’s current approach to questions of judicial
federalism. This Part asks what factors should be used
instead. Taking cues from Justice Thomas’s dissent in
Haywood and from earlier decisions, I suggest that the Court
should focus exclusively on prejudice. This represents a shift
in two key respects. First, discrimination is de-emphasized
and tolerated. It is not automatically suspect for a state to
treat federal or sister state claims differently from local
claims. Second, interference is assessed in light of the effect
of the court’s action on the continuing viability of the claim.
Dismissals need not meaningfully interfere if they are nonprejudicial and if an alternative forum is available.

Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2133 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment)); also need to discuss AT&T v. Concepcion here.
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A. Vertical Cases

1. Jurisdiction
When a state declines to hear a federal claim based on
a jurisdictional rule, the dismissal will usually come early in
the litigation process and be non-prejudicial in nature. The
combination of those two factors suggests that dismissals of
this sort will result in only mild interference with the
underlying federal rights. Of course, any dismissal is
disruptive at some level. But so long as the dismissal does
not infringe on the ability of the parties to pursue the claim
elsewhere, that disruption should not be considered to rise to
the level of constitutional concern. And this should be true
even if the jurisdictional rule applies only to, or primarily to,
federal claims.
Previous
decisions
involving
vertical
judicial
federalism have not been sensitive to the practical effect of
dismissal on the federal rights involved. Instead, the Court’s
approach has been formalistic, and has viewed any refusal to
hear a federal claim as an impermissible form of interference
with federal law.138 But Justice Thomas was onto something
in Haywood when he noted that “because the dismissal . . . is
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, it has no preclusive
effect on claims refiled in federal court and thus does not
alter the substance of the federal claim.”139 This goes beyond
a mere claim that under an original understanding of the
See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. In this sense,
these cases are kindred spirits with other recent decisions by the Court
that have been characterized as formalistic. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall,
131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011); Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without a
Foundation: Stern v. Marshall, __ SUP. CT. REV. __ (forthcoming 2012);
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
3138 (2010); Kent Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2012)(characterizing Free
Enterprise Fund as a “foray into formalism”).
139 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2132 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 160 (1988) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“Every plaintiff has the option of proceeding in federal court,
and the Wisconsin statute has not the slightest effect on that right.”).
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Supremacy Clause, the definition of jurisdiction remains
within the sovereign power of the states. Instead, it is a
functional argument about the extent of interference that
results from state action with respect to federal claims.
Under this sort of functional inquiry, whether
prejudice attaches to a state court dismissal becomes
crucially important. If a state chooses to structure a
jurisdictional dismissal as a final decision on the merits, then
the dismissal has dramatic effects for the ability of the
parties to pursue the claim elsewhere. This is a decision that
cannot be countenanced under the Supremacy Clause. Even
though the dismissal is jurisdictional in a formal sense, the
result demonstrates hostility to federal law. In essence, the
state is applying some other body of law to the merits of the
claim—namely, the state’s jurisdictional law that becomes a
basis for the prejudicial action. To apply some other law
besides federal law to determine the merits of a federal claim
is impermissible under any theory of vertical judicial
federalism.
But when a state court dismisses a federal claim
without prejudice, as in Haywood, the dismissal “does not
alter the substance of the federal claim” because a federal
forum will almost always be available to hear the claim after
dismissal.140 This is true for two reasons. First, as a matter
of personal jurisdiction, the federal courts track the personal
jurisdiction of the states in which they sit.141 Therefore, if
personal jurisdiction was proper in the state court that issues
the dismissal, it will also be proper in a federal court within
the same state. Second, as a matter of subject matter
jurisdiction, the dismissal of a claim that raises a federal
question will permit re-filing in federal court under the
jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.142 In Haywood,
Justice Thomas rightly emphasized that “Congress has
created inferior federal courts that have the power to
adjudicate all § 1983 claims” as part of his conclusion that
140

Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2132.

141

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).

142

Reverse Abstention

38

the “substance of the federal claim” would not be altered by a
state court dismissal.143 Because of concurrent personal
jurisdiction and the availability of general federal question
jurisdiction, non-prejudicial dismissals by a state court will
generally affect only the location of the suit, but not the
substance of the claim. While the jurisdictional rule might
reflect hostility to the federal claim, it does not result in
hostile action with respect to federal law.144
That may not always be true, however. In limited
situations, a dismissal that is non-prejudicial in form may
nevertheless result in meaningful interference. One example
of this is when federal law is presented as a defense to a
state-law claim. Clearly, if the state court simply ignored the
federal defense or refused to apply it, the result would be
constitutionally problematic.145 But could the state court
decline jurisdiction over the entire claim based on the
presence of the federal defense? The answer here should be
no, for the reason that such a dismissal would seriously
impair the status of the suit. The parties would not be
permitted to re-file the case in federal court because the
presence of the federal defense would not be sufficient to
trigger the availability of federal jurisdiction under a basic
application of the principle established in Mottley.146 A
second, and far less common, example would occur if
Congress created exclusive jurisdiction over federal claims in
the state courts. In that situation, a state court dismissal,
even if non-prejudicial in form, would be prejudicial in effect,
and that effect would be enough to trigger constitutional
concerns. In a case decided just this term, Justice Ginsburg
143
144

Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2132.
See id. at 2131 (“Resolving a federal claim with preclusive effect

based on a state-law defense is far different from simply closing the door
of the state courthouse to that federal claim.”).
145 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932).
146 Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
Perhaps it may be argued that this result would not offend any federal
interest because a dismissal would not grant any recovery in the face of a
potential federal defense. In other words, it is the plaintiff here, who is
asserting state rights, whose claim is hindered by the state court’s
decision.
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emphasized that congressional intent to divest the federal
courts of jurisdiction must be clear, and that an affirmative
grant of jurisdiction to the state courts is not sufficient.147
While conceptually interesting, this is an empty set of cases,
and is likely to remain so.

2. Procedure
The current Supreme Court doctrine recognizes that
the application of state procedures may in certain
circumstances result in interference with federal interests.148
In cases where such interference would result, the Court has
concluded that the federal procedures are supreme and that
state courts have an obligation to apply them. There are
essentially two categories of cases here. First, the federal
law might specifically define procedures that are associated
with substantive federal rights.149 Second, the federal law
might say nothing about the procedures that should be
applied, but the Court may nevertheless conclude that the
regularly applicable federal procedures are in some sense

See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, __ S.Ct. __, 2012 WL 125429
(Jan. 18, 2012).
148 See supra Part I.A.
149 See, e.g., Cent. Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1915)
(requiring defendants to carry the burden of proof for contributory
negligence under FELA, contrary to the Vermont rule); Dice v. Akron,
Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (finding that the
“right to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by
[FELA] to permit it to be classified as a mere ‘local rule of procedure’ for
denial [by the states]”). As Anthony Bellia has noted, these procedures
are not explicitly contained in FELA but have been implied as a matter of
statutory construction. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of
State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947, 959 (2001). Thus the line
between express, Congressional-mandated procedure accompanying a
federal right and procedures intertwined with federal rights may be a bit
blurry. In any case, express federal procedures would likely preempt
state procedures without much fuss. See Kevin M. Clermont, ReverseErie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20 (2006) (noting the clear preemption
where Congress “expressly…ma[kes] federal law applicable in state
court”).
147
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essential to the vindication of the federal substantive
interest.150
There is a similarity here to the standard Erie context,
where federal courts are directed by the Rules of Decision
Act151 to apply state rules of decision, which can sometimes
include state procedural rules that are related to the
definition of state substantive rights.152 But of course, under
Hanna federal procedural rules supported by the Rules
Enabling Act153 may be applied if found to be on point and
valid,154 even when the result is to displace a state rule that
is at least partially substantive in nature.155 And state
procedural rules that are not clearly substantive in nature,
but that may nevertheless affect the outcome of litigation,
may in certain instances be disregarded in favor of federal
rules if the competing federal interest in defining its own

See, e.g., Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1949)
(requiring states to apply more liberal federal pleading standards, as
opposed to stricter local rules, in FELA actions); but see Johnson v.
Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 915 (1997) (refusing to require states to allow
interlocutory appeals upon denial of qualified immunity under §1983).
Even the absence of a certain defense in federal court can lead to
disallowing such a defense in a state court hearing a federal claim.
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (refusing to allow a Florida school
board to assert a state sovereign immunity defense).
In a related vein, a state law may act as an obstacle to vindication of
the federal right, regardless of the existence of a regularly applicable,
conflicting federal procedure. See, e.g., Russell v. CSX Trans., 689 So.2d
1354, 1358 (La. 1997) (finding state forum non conveniens law
discriminatory in a FELA case); Bunch v. Robinson, 712 A.2d 585, 588–89
(Md. App. 1998) (finding state common-law immunity defense
discriminatory in an FLSA case), rev’d on other grounds, 788 A.2d 636
(Md. 2002).
151 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
152 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535
(1958) (concluding that federal courts must apply state rules if those
rules are “bound up” with the state-created substantive right).
153 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
154 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965).
155 See, e.g., Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7
(1987) (overturning a state mandatory affirmance penalty statute in
favor of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38).
150
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procedures is sufficiently great.156 States have no parallel
mechanisms that would permit them to deny the
enforcement of federal procedures that the Supreme Court
defines as essential to the vindication of federal rights.157 As
a result, the burdens imposed by the reverse Erie cases are
potentially much greater. When combined with the cases
that require state courts to take jurisdiction over federal
claims, a state court may find itself forced to hear a federal
claim and to apply burdensome federal procedures.
In Haywood, Justice Thomas proposed to reduce these
burdens by requiring express preemption of state procedures
before a federal procedure would become binding in state
court—in other words, by eliminating the second category of
cases described above. I am generally sympathetic to the
impulse to acknowledge the burdens that may be imposed by
federal procedures that attend a federal claim. But the
model that he proposes presents thorny characterization
problems because the scope of the state’s power is directly
sensitive to whether a particular rule is jurisdictional,
procedural, or substantive.158
156

See Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438

(1996).
Not only do states lack any parallel refusal power, it would not be
overstating the obvious to note that the Supremacy Clause forces federal
procedure into the state courts far more pervasively than state procedure
makes its way into federal courts via Erie analysis. Kevin M. Clermont,
Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 40 (2006).
158 This question is not easy to answer, and is generally associated
with unforeseen baggage. See Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal
Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 66 (2008) (creating a four-factor
analysis for determining whether a rule is procedural or jurisdictional);
Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts
on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1553 (2008) (noting the
importance of characterization as a merits rule, which cannot be applied
until jurisdictional or procedural questions are resolved);
Karen
Petroski, Statutory Genres: Substance, Procedure, Jurisdiction at 67
(2012) (draft under submission) (concluding that the jurisdictionalcharacterization doctrines are better developed and more functionoriented than the substance-procedure dichotomy of Erie fame); Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210 (2007) (describing some of the consequences of
characterization as either a “claims-processing” or “jurisdictional” rule);
157
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A different way to reduce these burdens would be to
expand the state court’s ability to refuse jurisdiction over a
federal claim when that claim carries with it a set of federal
procedures that the states cannot easily implement.159 This
would equalize the treatment of dismissals rooted in
jurisdiction and procedure. As with the pure jurisdictional
decisions discussed in the previous section, the state court
must ensure that a federal court is available to hear the
claim once dismissed, and must structure the dismissal so
that it produces no prejudice to the federal rights involved.
Moreover, the state court should ensure that any dismissal
occurs early in the litigation process. Unlike questions
relating to subject matter jurisdiction, procedural issues may
not naturally arise in the course of litigation until significant
time and resources have been expended. At some point, the
disruption and delay stemming from a dismissal based on the
difficulty of applying federal procedural rules may be
effectively prejudicial to the legal rights of the parties. State
courts should therefore consider the procedural difficulties
presented by the presence of a federal claim when the case is
filed, and should reach decisions relating to abstention
promptly.
B. Horizontal Cases

1. Dismissals
As discussed in Part II, the public policy exception was
traditionally conceived as both narrow and jurisdictional.
Thus understood, it is not a part of the choice of law process.
That is, public policy is not a factor that contributes to the
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514–15 (2006) (concluding that
Congress could have, but did not, characterize the employee-numerosity
requirement of Title VII as jurisdictional).
159 Wendy Parmet makes a similar argument when she points out
that Congressional “federalization” of state procedure can carry with it
“heavy burdens” for state courts. Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption:
The Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 VILLANOVA L.
REV. 1, 15 (1999).
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choice of a particular law to be applied, but is considered only
after that initial choice had been made. The question asked
in cases like Loucks is whether the law selected through the
traditional choice of law process should be enforced by the
forum. But precisely because the selection has already
occurred, the potential answers to that question are limited.
A court may decide to apply the law, or it may decide not to.
Even in that latter circumstance, the court’s determination of
what law should be applied to the claim is unaffected.
Instead, the conclusion is that the claim is still governed by
the selected law, but that the forum court should not or
cannot be the one to apply it.
Understood this way, it is difficult to sustain a
distinction between the public policy exception and rules like
those at issue in Hughes. The difference that appears
implicit in the way that the contexts have been treated is
that Hughes involves a post-choice of law decision to refuse
enforcement of a sister-state law, while the public policy
exception operates within the choice of law process itself.
Because the Court is unwilling to delve into the particulars
of a state’s choice of law methodology, the public policy
exception escapes scrutiny.160 But the public policy analysis
performed in cases like Loucks takes place after the
traditional jurisdiction-selection has been completed, and it
is therefore an error to treat it as part of the selection itself.
If the exception is triggered, it operates to override the choice
of law produced by the system that the state has adopted,
and it does so precisely based on a public policy in the state
that demands that result. In that sense, it is no different
from the rule at issue in Hughes, which was read to create a
public policy that required the refusal of a sister state law.161
Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI.
L. REV. 440, 448 (1982) (arguing that the Court’s choice of law analysis in
horizontal contexts, such as Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, requires only a
“minimum of fairness and reasonableness” which “will always be assured
by a process that weeds out the arbitrary and unreasonable”).
161 Of course, the rule at issue in Hughes was statutory and
categorical, while the public policy exception is invoked by judges on a
case-by-case basis. It is difficult to see why the distinction in terms of the
160
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From the standpoint of discrimination, both results are
equally offensive.162
What does distinguish Loucks and Hughes is the
nature of the resulting dismissal. To be clear, Loucks itself
did not result in a dismissal at all. But the formulation
developed by Cardozo would result in a jurisdictional
dismissal if the court had concluded that the foreign law
violated local public policy.163 On the other hand, the
Wisconsin court in Hughes not only refused to apply the
competing law of Illinois, but read the statute to require a
dismissal of the claim on the merits. The public policy
dismissal is disruptive and inconvenient, to be sure. But no
prejudicial action is taken, and the plaintiff may seek an
alternative venue in which to press the claim. Moreover,
because of the increased flexibility in the law of personal
jurisdiction, an alternative venue is almost certainly
available.164 In Hughes, on the other hand, the dismissal is
prejudicial, and efforts to revive the claim in an alternative
source of the rule should matter. In other contexts, the Court has
rejected attempts to introduce distinctions based on whether a state’s
action takes the form of statute or common-law activity. But the
difference between a categorical rule and a discretionary one is relevant.
See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (arguing
that the real question in the jurisdictional characterization inquiry
should be whether the rule is mandatory because such a categorization
carries with it important litigation consequences).
162 This is Larry Kramer’s point, and to the extent his argument is
based on a claim that both are discriminatory, I agree. See Larry
Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1998 (1997).
163 See, e.g., Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 54 A.2d 669, 671 (Conn.
1947) (finding in a case involving a horse-race betting contract that “the
claim here presented, although valid under the law of another
jurisdiction, contravenes the ancient and deep-rooted public policy of this
state and therefore cannot be enforced in our courts”); Republic of Iraq v.
First Nat’l City Bank, 241 F. Supp. 567, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (dismissing
a foreign plaintiff’s claim to recover confiscated goods as offensive to New
York public policy). Note that the decision in First National might be
more prejudicial than Ciampittiello—the foreign plaintiff would likely be
just as unsuccessful in trying to obtain and then enforce a foreign
judgment in New York.
164 See supra notes 97, 110–111 and accompanying text.
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forum would be unsuccessful.165 From the standpoint of
interference, then, the two cases are very different.
In Hughes itself, Justice Black noted but did not
emphasize the prejudicial nature of the dismissal.166 But
that fact should properly be viewed as central to the result.
To dismiss a claim on the merits because it is based on the
law of a sister state is a result that is fundamentally
inconsistent with any concept of full faith and credit, even
one focused primarily on undue interference. The prejudice
that attaches to the resulting judgment creates a virtually
insurmountable barrier to vindicating the claim. Had the
rule in Hughes been applied to refuse the claim altogether,
however, the analysis should be different. In that case, the
legitimate interests of the state in structuring the way that it
devotes resources to claims pursued within its court system
are implicated. These are the procedural interests urged by
Justice Frankfurter in his Hughes dissent.167 But even if
Frankfurter’s discussion of the state’s interests is persuasive,
his conclusion is misguided. A state should be permitted to
further its procedural interests in structuring its judicial
processes only when doing so does not significantly interfere
with the substantive rights of a sister state. A prejudicial
dismissal never passes that test; a non-prejudicial dismissal
might.168

An alternative forum would not have power to deny the Wisconsin
judgment full faith and credit based on its assessment that the policy
embedded in the judgment was undesirable. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998); Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 551 (1947); Roche
v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 452 (1928).
166 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951). Black’s ignorance
(genuine or intended) of the serious topic of prejudice is part of what
makes the opinion difficult to understand.
167 See id. at 618–19 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
168 It is difficult to be categorical about the acceptability of a nonprejudicial dismissal because there may be circumstances where such a
dismissal will have practical effects beyond necessitating a change of
venue. Indeed, a court applying the exception in this manner should be
required to think in those terms. See infra note 171 and accompanying
text.
165
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None of this means that the use of a public policy
exception is always acceptable. Instead, the argument
presented here supports only a narrower assertion that the
public policy exception as articulated in Loucks is not
categorically objectionable, at least not on an interferencebased theory of full faith and credit. This distinction is
important because the public policy exception is not always
applied consistently with the Loucks formulation. Courts
frequently use the exception not as a basis for dismissal, but
as a basis for substituting and applying the forum law.169
When it takes this form, the public policy exception is very
close to Hughes because it results in a prejudicial action with
respect to the claim. By definition, the forum law is different
from the foreign law that would otherwise be selected
through traditional choice of law rules, and the difference is
a significant one.170 To apply the forum law, and to
ultimately decide the claim on the merits, thus displaces the
foreign law entirely and precludes its enforcement elsewhere.
The first step of the analysis under a prejudice-based theory
of full faith and credit must be that if a state refuses to apply
the law of a sister state on the grounds that it is foreign, the
See, e.g., Farmers’ & Merchs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 250 N.W.
214, 219–220 (Iowa 1933) (finding Texas law unjust but seemingly
dismissing on the merits by concluding “the petition does not state a
cause of action against the defendants”); Owen v. Owen, 444 N.W.2d 710,
713 (S.D. 1989) (applying South Dakota guest statute because Indiana’s
law was offensive forum public policy); See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.,
793 S.W.2d 670. 678–79 (Tex. 1990) (holding that Texas law applied to a
contract dispute notwithstanding terms that expressly designated chose
Florida law as governing). Paulsen and Sovern also recognized the
harmful effects of widespread merits-level dismissals based on public
policy, finding that few cases actually upheld the principle that public
policy dismissals left other states, lacking the policy scruples of the
forum, open for the plaintiff to pursue his claim. Monrad G. Paulsen &
Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L.
REV. 969, 1010–11 (1956).
170 Courts invoke the exception on the basis of policy differences that
are much less fundamental than those imagined by Cardozo in Loucks,
see, e.g., Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 54 A.2d 669, 671 (Conn. 1947)
(barring a case involving horse-race betting), but to trigger the exception,
the difference must be significant.
169

Reverse Abstention

47

refusal to do so must take a non-prejudicial form. As with
Hughes, this form of a public policy exception does not
survive that first step.
Refusals that do survive that first step should not
always be viewed as permissible, however. Instead, a
decision to refuse a claim rooted in the law of another state,
even when structured as a non-prejudicial dismissal, should
be permitted only if the dismissal will not unduly interfere
with the claim. Undue interference means something other
than the inconvenience of having to re-file in an alternative
forum. Rather, courts should do something along the lines of
what is done in the context of a forum non conveniens
analysis.
There, a court must convince itself that a
competent alternative forum is available to hear the claim
before it dismisses the claim.171 The same should be true
here.
The primary barrier to the availability of an
alternative forum will be personal jurisdiction in the courts
of a sister state, and courts should ensure that personal
jurisdiction may be sustained there, either through a
minimum contacts and long arm analysis or through consent
of the defendant. One of the implications of this requirement
is that a categorical rule barring a claim rooted in sister state
law will be suspect. Courts must have the discretion to hear
the claim if necessary to support the interstate system of
justice. But if a state court concludes that it is unwilling to
apply the law of a sister state, and if in response to that
conclusion it dismisses the claim without prejudice after
assuring that the courts of a sister state are competent to

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981); see also
Joel H. Samuels, When is An Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking
the Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 85 IND. L.J. 1059, 1081–82 (2010)
(arguing that forum non conveniens is a useful doctrine, but that courts
impermissibly downplay the importance of whether another forum can
and will hear a claim before dismissing for forum non conveniens); but
see Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search
of a Role, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1263–65 (1986) (arguing that
jurisdictional doctrines can and should subsume the functions of forum
non conveniens, thus eliminating it entirely).
171
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hear it, the interstate system should be willing to tolerate
that result.

2. Defenses
A second implication of a focus on interference is that
states should not be permitted to reject the application of a
defense on the grounds that it is foreign. The distinction
between claims and defenses was first articulated by Justice
Brandeis in Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper.172 There, in a
worker’s compensation action, a federal court sitting in
diversity chose to apply the law of New Hampshire, where
the death being sued on occurred, rather than the law of
Vermont, where all relevant parties were from.173 The
Supreme Court rejected that choice, and Brandeis explained
the problem this way:
But the company is in a position different from that of a
plaintiff who seeks to enforce a cause of action conferred
by the laws of another state. The right which it claims
should be given effect is set up by way of defense to an
asserted liability; and to a defense different
considerations apply. A state may, on occasion, decline to
enforce a foreign cause of action. In so doing, it merely
denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the plaintiff’s
substantive right, so that he is free to enforce it
elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect to a substantive
defense under the applicable law of another state . . .
subjects the defendant to irremediable liability. This may
not be done.174

Clapper has generally fallen out of favor, largely because it
was decided in a period when the Supreme Court took the
constraints imposed by the constitution on the choice of law
process more seriously than it does today.175 Brandeis’s
236 U.S. 145 (1932).
Id. at 151.
174 Id. at 160.
175 See id. at 161 (comparing interests of states); Alaska Packers
Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547–50 (1935) (giving
great deference to the rights of states to apply their own laws in their
172
173
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conclusion that full faith and credit principles required the
application of Vermont law is not consistent with the
constitutional choice of law principles established by more
modern cases.176 But from the standpoint of interference, the
distinction between claims and defenses remains a sensible
and useful one. As discussed in the previous section, a
refusal to decide a sister state claim might be discriminatory
in some sense, but it will rarely result in meaningful
interference with state-created rights.177 Put differently,
refusing a claim is non-prejudicial, at least when there is an
alternative forum available to decide the claim.
But refusing a defense is quite different. Consider
Paul v. National Life.178 Suit was filed in West Virginia
based on a fatal car accident that killed two West Virginia
residents in Indiana.179 Application of the traditional choice
of law approach led to the selection of Indiana law, which
included a guest statute that limited recovery by guests
against their hosts.180 When that decision was appealed, the
state supreme court firmly rejected the suggestion that it
own courts and not finding Alaska’s interest “superior” such that it need
be applied in place of California law); Pacific Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus.
Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939) (“To the extent that
California is required to give full faith and credit to the conflicting
Massachusetts statute it must be denied the right to apply in its own
courts its own statute, constitutionally enacted in pursuance of its policy
to provide compensation for employees injured in their employment
within the state. It must withhold the remedy given by its own statute to
its residents by way of compensation for medical, hospital and nursing
services rendered to the injured employee, and it must remit him to
Massachusetts to secure the administrative remedy which that state has
provided. We cannot say that the full faith and credit clause goes so far.”
176 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312 (1981) (requiring
only that a “State must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”); see also Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (noting that Allstate
recognized only “modest restrictions on the application of forum law”
under full faith and credit).
177 See supra Part III.B.1.
178 Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986).
179 Id. at 550.
180 Id. at 550–51.
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should reconsider its devotion to the traditional choice of law
regime.181 That portion of the opinion, which contains many
memorable and pithy turns of phrase, has earned the case a
place in many conflict of laws casebooks. But Paul is also an
example of a modern use of the public policy exception. At
the end of the opinion, the court found that guest statutes
violate the public policy of West Virginia, and therefore
concluded that “we will no longer enforce the automobile
guest passenger statutes of foreign jurisdictions in our
courts.”182 But the court did not follow that statement with a
jurisdictional dismissal of the claim under review, and
instead remanded the case “for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.”183
Precisely what those proceedings would look like is
somewhat unclear. One possibility is that the application of
the public policy doctrine would require dismissal of the suit,
in accordance with cases like Loucks. But that result could
have been achieved by the supreme court directly; further
proceedings would not have been required.
A second
possibility is that the application of the public policy doctrine
would lead to the substitution of West Virginia law. That
application of the public policy doctrine would be problematic
for the reasons described in the prior section.184 A final
possibility is that the application of the public policy doctrine
would lead to the continued application of Indiana law, but
without the availability of the guest statute. This third
option runs afoul of Clapper. At one level, it might be viewed
as more respectful to Indiana to continue to apply as much of
that state’s law as is consistent with West Virginia’s public
policy.
But Indiana’s guest statute acts as a partial
immunity to liability that can be set up as a defense in cases
where something less than willfulness is proven. For West
Virginia to ignore that defense results in a prejudicial—or, to
Id. at 556 (“Having mastered marble, we decline an apprenticeship
in bronze. We therefore reaffirm our adherence to the doctrine of lex loci
delicti today.”).
182 Paul, 352 S.E.2d at 556.
181

183
184

Id.
See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text.
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use Brandeis’s term, “irremediable”—determination of the
claim that directly interferes with legal rights established by
Indiana. To apply something less than all of Indiana’s law is
in some sense not to apply to Indiana’s law at all. West
Virginia may choose to apply Indiana’s law, or it may choose
not to. It should not be free, however, to apply Indiana’s law
selectively.185
IV. JUSTIFYING THE NEW MODEL
A. Trust
If adopted, the model developed in Part III would
increase the authority of state courts. The contemplated
increase is not unconstrained: state courts would always be
required to ensure that their actions do not result in
prejudice to the legal claims presented to them. But it is an
increase nonetheless. For that reason, the model is bound to
trigger anxieties among those who harbor a deep and abiding
distrust of state courts.
Such distrust is an established pastime, and one that
is particularly salient in the context of vertical federalism.186
In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
upheld the minimalist approach to evaluating states’ choice of law
doctrines. 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988). There, he noted that Kansas
properly applied the laws of other states, in compliance with the Court’s
Shutts ruling. Id. Solidifying the Court’s hands-off attitude to state
choice of law, he concluded that a state cannot violate full faith and credit
or due process by simple misconstruction of a sister state’s law. Id. at
730–31. Rather, “the misconstruction must contradict law of the other
State that is clearly established and that has been brought to the court's
attention” for it to raise constitutional concerns. Id. at 731. From the
perspective of Paul, a decision by West Virginia to apply an Indiana claim
but not an Indiana defense might qualify as a judgment that reflects just
such a contradiction of clearly-established law.
186
While the trust argument has been invoked most frequently in the
context of vertical federalism, some of the underlying claims apply with
equal force in the horizontal context. Admittedly, not all of the claims
translate. For example, although judicial selection mechanisms vary
from state to state, the protections accorded Article III judges in the
federal system are unique, and the institutional advantages that flow
185
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The Supreme Court itself has never directly questioned the
ability of state courts to handle federal business,187 but
academic commentators have not been so shy.
Most
famously, Burt Neuborne argued in 1977 that federal courts
are “institutionally preferable to state appellate courts as

from those protections are similarly unique. But the argument that state
judges will be unfamiliar with federal law and will therefore be less
competent to interpret and apply that law retains force when a state
applies the law of another state. Perhaps competing state laws are more
familiar than federal law, but certainly both are outside the domain of
the court’s natural expertise. Indeed, the competence concerns may be
even greater in the horizontal context because there is less opportunity
for error correction. When a state court mistakenly applies federal law,
that decision is subject to review and correction by the United States
Supreme Court. But when a court in State X mistakenly applies the law
of State Y, the availability of review is much weaker. Certainly the
decision may not be collaterally reviewed by the only courts not subject to
disadvantages associated with lack of familiarity: those of State Y.
Instead, State Y is bound by the judgment issued by State X, even if it
rests on a misapplication of State Y law. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum,
210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908) (“Whether the award would or would not have
been conclusive, and whether the ruling of the Missouri court upon that
matter was right or wrong, there can be no question that the judgment
was conclusive in Missouri on the validity of the cause of action.”); MGM
Desert Inn, Inc. v. Holz, 411 S.E.2d 399, 402–03 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(upholding Nevada judgment related to gaming debt notwithstanding
North Carolina anti-gambling statute that would prevent enforcement of
the debt in its courts in the first instance). On the other hand, the
United States Supreme Court is empowered to review the decision on the
grounds that State X’s decision failed to give full faith and credit to the
law of State Y. But the standard of review in those cases is exceedingly
weak. See supra note 185. And even if the Supreme Court were entitled
to do more, there is no reason to think that it would not suffer from the
same competence deficiencies as did the State X courts.
187
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–94 n.35 (1976); Haywood v.
Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2018, 2114 (2009); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367–
68 (1990)). But on at least one occasion, the Court has been charged with
questioning state courts indirectly. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (chiding the majority for their
“unarticulated assumption that state courts will not be as prone as
federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights promptly and
effectively”).
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forums in which to raise federal constitutional claims.”188
That assertion rested on a set of three claims about the
comparative advantages of federal judges as arbiters of
federal rights: (1) that federal judges have superior technical
competence in dealing with federal rights, (2) that federal
judges are psychologically more open to federal claims, and
(3) that federal judges are insulated from majoritarian
pressures that might constrain the enforcement of federal
rights.189 Although not universally accepted,190 these claims
quickly became commonplace in the academic literature and
have remained so ever since.191
That said, the standard trust-based criticisms have
increasingly come under attack in recent years. Twenty
years ago, Erwin Chemerinsky noted that Neuborne’s
contention that federal judges would be more solicitous of
federal rights claims, or at least particular federal rights
claims, might be related to the domination of federal courts
by Democratic appointees.192
If so, then the shifting
composition of federal courts toward Republican appointees
188

(1977).
189

Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116

Id. at 1120–21.

William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 599, 600 (1999); Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or
190

Suppression: Due Process and the Response to Judicial Campaign
Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 621, 629–30 (2004); Frederic M. Bloom,
State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 550–51 (2008); see also
Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of
State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 233, 257–58 (1999)
(attempting an empirical comparison of state and federal treatment of
constitutional questions, showing that there is little meaningful
difference).
191 Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop,
62 ALA. L. REV. 687, 715 n.129 (2011); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism

in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State
Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1013, 1045–46 (2007) (foreseeing
discrepancies based on state-court distaste for federal regulatory
agencies); Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial
Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 799 (1995).
192 Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV.
593, 599 (1991).
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“diminishes any basis for greater trust in federal courts.”193 A
few years later, William Rubenstein went a step further,
suggesting that—at least in the context of modern gay-rights
litigation—federal courts were increasingly being viewed as
less trustworthy venues than their state counterparts.194
Others have since broadened and refined Rubenstein’s
argument; while some federal claims may be similar to the
gay rights account, others are likely to benefit from the same
compositional changes.195
The larger thrust of these
arguments is that the parity debate is not about trust at all,
at least not entirely so. Instead, claims of parity or its
absence often serve to “disguise the expression of nakedly
ideological preferences.”196 As a result, the degree to which
we are bothered by an increase in the authority of state
Id.; see also Edward Purcell, Reconsidering the Frankfurterian
Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW &
193

SOC. INQUIRY 679, 712 (1999) (“[I]n spite of the continued salience of local
pressures and partisan politics, federal judges ten[d] increasingly to be
drawn from the upper echelons of the bar with more pronounced national
orientations and stronger commitments to professionally defined norms
of law and judicial behavior.”). Even Professor Neuborne conceded that
these compositional changes affect the relative advantage provided by a
federal forum. Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial
Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 798–99 (1995).
194 William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority , 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 599, 606–11 (1999) (recounting the shift toward state courts in
gay rights litigation).
Part of Rubenstein’s explanation for that
phenomenon was context-specific: state judges had particular expertise
in family law issues that made them more sympathetic to the claims
being presented. Id. at 612–14. But part of the argument was structural
and compositional, and rested on the assertion that the majoritarian
pressures felt by state judges may in certain circumstances lead them to
be more sympathetic to rights-based claims than the insulated—and
increasingly conservative—judges populating our federal courthouses.
Id. at 619–21; see also DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN
LAW 110–13 (2003) (making a similar point).
195 Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the
Justifications for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CAL. L. REV. 95, 112
(2009) (arguing that things like second amendment claims may be more
favored in a federal forum).
196 Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction:
Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts , 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1211, 1222 (2004).
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courts is contingent, both in terms of time and in terms of the
nature of the particular federal rights at stake.
Even setting that general point aside, there is a much
more specific reason why concerns about trust should not act
as a barrier to the proposal being suggested here. Those who
lack trust in state courts are generally uncomfortable giving
those courts additional power to decide claims. But in this
case, the additional power being conferred is a power to
decline to decide claims. In this sense, the proposal is
consonant with the intuition that state judges may not
always be equipped to decide claims based on federal law or
the laws of other states. In those circumstances, the best
course is not to force the state to render a decision that may
contain errors but not be subject to adequate review, or to
permit the state to substitute some other law in favor of the
law that is either unfamiliar or disagreeable. Rather, it is to
provide for the state courts something akin to the abstention
doctrines that permit otherwise competent federal courts to
decline to decide state claims when certain conditions are
satisfied.197 Those abstention doctrines are invoked not as a
way to offend state law, but to respect it. Similarly, this
proposal furthers the goal of ensuring that courts deciding
claims on the merits are unbiased and competent, and for
that reason it should enhance rather than undermine our
sense of trust in the judicial system.198

See generally Leonard Birdsong, Comity and Our Federalism in
the Twenty-First Century: The Abstention Doctrines Will Always be
With Us—Get Over It!!, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 375 (2003) (discussing
197

various forms of federal abstention and their trajectories and usefulness
in the twenty-first century); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (arguing that jurisdictional
discretion under the abstention doctrines is expansive); Martin H.
Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (generally disapproving of federal
abstention as violative of separation of powers, namely, undermining
Congress’s discretion to regulate jurisdiction).
198 See Verity Winship, Aligning Law and Forum 19 (draft)
(discussing situations where the alignment of law and forum should be
encouraged or required).
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B. Authority
The fact that a reverse abstention power should
enhance trust in the judicial system—or that such a power
might be a good idea for any other reason, for that matter—is
ultimately irrelevant and unavailing if the power cannot be
justified as a matter of constitutional authority. Therefore it
is necessary to assess whether the Constitution can sustain a
reading that would permit states to decline to decide federal
and sister-state claims. What follows here is a sketch of that
assessment.199
The Supreme Court’s inflexible understanding of the
constitutional constraints imposed by the Supremacy Clause
and to a lesser extent by the Full Faith and Credit Clause
should be updated to reflect contemporary realities. While a
federal power to impose an unyielding obligation on state
courts may be justified as constitutional in the absence of an
established system of federal courts, or in a context where a
refusal to decide would result in meaningful interference
with the legal rights, the same power may become unjustified
once those affiliating circumstances have changed. In other
words, the availability of a reverse abstention power may be
contextual and contingent both on historical developments
and on the practical effects of particular institutional
arrangements.
This is an argument that draws on several recent
developments
in
constitutional
interpretation
and
federalism. A starting point is Lawrence Lessig’s theory of
translation.200 As a general matter, translation supports the
A comprehensive account of the authority for reverse abstention is
the subject of future work. See Samuel P. Jordan, Polyphonic Abstention
(forthcoming).
200 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1165 (1993) (formulating a “translation” theory of constitutional
interpretation that accommodates, and indeed requires assessment of,
historical context). In Lessig’s oft-quoted formulation, “to be faithful to
the constitutional structure, the Court must be willing to be unfaithful to
the constitutional text.” Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:
United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 193 (1995). One could in
fact trace this sort of argument back much further. See, e.g., Theodore
199
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possibility of a flexible understanding of constitutional
powers that is informed by constitutional structure, and it
has been deployed in the specific domain of federalism to
suggest the development of extra-textual constitutional rules
that would preserve the balance between federal and state
power contemplated by the Constitution.201 Drawing in part
on notions of translation, Robert Schapiro has more recently
developed a theory of polyphonic federalism that provides
additional authority for a reverse abstention power.202
Schapiro’s work is part of a larger scholarly attack on the
dualist nature of Supreme Court doctrine in the area of
Eisenberg. Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 501 (1974) (arguing that the permanence
of lower federal courts in the modern era necessitates reevaluation of
Congress’s constitutional authority to restrict their jurisdiction).
201 Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez,
1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 192 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court
should be free “to craft, to construct, to make-up, limits on regulative
authority, both state and federal, so as to check the growth in the
commerce power, to the extent that growth has set the original balance
[between the federal and state powers] askew”); see also Ernest A. Young,

Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1175–76
(2005) (advocating for “compensating adjustments” that allow judges to
re-work the federalism balance that is broadly and incompletely
embodied in the constitutional text); Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1502 (1994) (“The best
[constitutional] interpretation is one that accommodates both goals [of
federalism] and faithfully transposes them onto modern circumstances.”);
but see John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2040 (2009)
(arguing that the constitution did not impose any “balance” that can be
maintained by translation); Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism:
A Structural Approach, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (1998)
(criticizing Lessig’s approach for its failure to respect separation of
powers). Orin Kerr has put forward an approach to the Fourth
Amendment that balances the concerns of originalists, translators, and
living constitutionalists by carefully limiting the circumstances that will
allow a change in constitutional interpretation. Orin S. Kerr, An
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 531–32 (2011).
202 See generally ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM
(2009).

Reverse Abstention

58

federalism. Under a dualist framework, power “must be
allocated to either the national government or state
governments.”203
Polyphonic federalism, like other
“compatibilist” theories of federalism,204 focuses instead on
the question of “how to harness the dynamic interaction of
state and federal power.”205
But Schapiro’s work is
particularly important because it seeks to move beyond
claims of instrumental benefit and situate the argument at
the level of constitutional theory.206 Garrick Pursley has
usefully described Schapiro’s theory as one that creates space
for the consideration of polyphonic values like plurality,
dialogue, and redundancy in the development of federalism
decision rules.207 That space and those values can support
the right of state courts to decline jurisdiction in a manner
that preserves legal rights.

ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 82 (2009).
Garrick Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1365,
1367 (2011). Other “versions” of compatibilist arguments abound. See,
e.g., Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism:
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power , 57
DUKE L.J. 1933, 2020 (2008) (advocating constitutional “realism”); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Empowering States:
The Need to Limit Federal
Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69, 74–75 (2005) (outlining a theory of
“empowerment” federalism that broadly construes federal regulatory
powers while narrowing the scope of preemption); Philip J. Weiser,
Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism , 79
N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001) (approving Congress’s “middle ground
solution between the extremes of dual federalism and preemptive
federalism” that “outstrip[s] existing constitutional rhetoric which
envisions a separation [between state and federal spheres] that does not
exist in practice”).
205 ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 82 (2009).
206 As such, it attempts to respond to the criticisms lobbed at theories
of “new federalism” on the grounds that the theories pay insufficient
attention to the limitations imposed by constitutional text. See, e.g.,
Stuart Minor Benjamin and Ernest A. Young , Tennis with the Net Down:
Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2119
(2008); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially
Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 895 (1999).
207 Garrick Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1365,
1367, 1383 (2011).
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Finally, even if a reverse abstention power is not
constitutionally compelled, it may be statutorily created.
Congress has a clear source of power to provide states with
increased authority in both the horizontal and vertical
contexts. With respect to federal claims, Congress is
ultimately responsible for choosing which courts will have
jurisdictional authority.208 This means that state courts
already rely on federal jurisdictional statutes, and there is no
reason why those statutes could not also include a federally
approved mechanism that would permit state courts to
refuse federal claims in particular contexts and under certain
conditions. In other words, the statutory choice facing
Congress need not be viewed as a binary one between
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction, but could also include
forms of discretionary jurisdiction that would give state
courts the authority but not the obligation to decide federal
claims.
Similarly, with respect to horizontal claims,
Congress has the power under Article IV to legislate the
effect of the laws of the states.209 Legislation that requires
states to deal with claims based on the laws of sister states in
a non-prejudicial manner would easily fit within the scope of
that power. In short, even if the constitutional contours of
See Martin v. Hunters’ Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 340 (1816) (finding
that state courts are empowered and expected to hear federal claims).
Bankruptcy cases are one example of the lower federal courts’ exclusive
jurisdiction. See 11 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006); see also 13 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURISDICTION § 3527 (3d
ed. 2002) (listing other subject matter within the federal courts’ exclusive
jurisdiction). The Court generally requires express language from
Congress that “affirmatively divest[s] state courts of their presumptively
concurrent jurisdiction.” Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S.
820, 823 (1990). However, exclusive jurisdiction may also be created “by
unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.”
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).
209 U.S. CONST. art. IV (“And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof.); see also Yarborough v. Yarborough,
290 U.S. 202, (1933) (reasoning that Congressional power over full faith
and credit allows the doctrine to be expanded or contracted from its
constitutional minimum).
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judicial federalism are viewed as both fixed and inconsistent
with reverse abstention power, all is not lost.
CONCLUSION
States should have greater flexibility and power to
determine the extent to which they decide claims that are
rooted in the law of other actors within our federal system.
The current approach to these questions is unduly
restrictive, particularly with respect to federal claims. Given
the current structure of personal jurisdiction and the
developed nature of the federal courts, these restrictions are
unnecessary. Standard principles of comity will generally
encourage a state to entertain federal and sister state
claims.210 But if a state, for whatever reason, decides that it
does not want to hear such a claim, the decision to abstain
should be respected so long as it does not meaningfully
prejudice the claim or the legal rights involved.

Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 689–90 (2001) (noting that
210

comity promotes cooperative federalism values and state sovereignty);
Charlton C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court: Judicial Federalism
Through a Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 511, 530, 540
(2011) (disparaging “allocation” of jurisdiction, instead promoting
“relational” jurisdiction based on reciprocity and comity concerns).
However, Louis Weinberg has argued against comity principles and
suggested that multistate policy and “collective advantage” may be better
supported by consistently applying forum law. Louise Weinberg, Against
Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 58, 70–73 (1991)(arguing against comity
principles and suggesting that multistate policy and “collective
advantage” may be better supported by consistently applying forum law).

